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ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW-IN THE FACE OF RACIAL
PROFILING, THE FIRST CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT
LONGSTANDING ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES
MUST YIELD TO AIRLINE SAFETY:
CERQUEIRA V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
BENJAMIN D. WILLIAMS*
TN CERQUEIRA V American Airlines, Inc.,' the First Circuit
ICourt of Appeals lobbed a forceful blow against longstanding,
well-regarded antidiscrimination law by holding that 49 U.S.C.
§ 44902(b)-a statute that permits air carriers to refuse to trans-
port a ticketed passenger that the carrier decides "is, or might
be, inimical to safety"2 -eclipses the protections of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which proscribes racial discrimination in the making
and performance of contracts.4 The First Circuit's decision
overturned a jury finding that American Airlines removed a pas-
senger from one of its flights in violation of the antidiscrimina-
tion requirements of § 1981. 5 Based on an overly broad
interpretation of § 44902(b), the court's holding will essentially
allow a carrier to evade § 1981 liability for illegal racial discrimi-
nation in its passenger ticketing contracts by creating an all-en-
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.S., magna cum laude, Southern Methodist University. The author would like to
thank Bethany Ashley and Gary Walden, who have both provided unwavering,
selfless support during law school.
520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008).
2 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Specifically, the statute pro-
vides that "an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier may refuse to
transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to
safety." Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). To prove unlawful discrimination in contracting
under § 1981, a plaintiff must typically show (1) her membership in a racial mi-
nority; (2) that the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race;
and (3) the discrimination concerned the right to make and enforce contracts.
Dasrath v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 444-45 (D.N.J. 2006) (citing
Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002)).
4 See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 13-14.
5 Id. at 20.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERC
compassing immunity under § 44902(b). 6 The court's decision,
therefore, could spawn a host of deleterious civil rights conse-
quences, including court-sanctioned racial profiling in airline
operations, because the decision chips away at stalwart antidis-
crimination law that was to this point a hallmark of our nation's
civil rights framework.
In December 2003, John Cerqueira, a U.S. citizen of Portu-
guese descent with dark hair and an olive complexion,7 was a
confirmed airline passenger aboard American Flight 2237 from
Boston to Ft. Lauderdale.8 Seemingly innocuous events during
and before the boarding phase of the flight apparently caused
concern among some of the flight's crew. For example, before
boarding, Cerqueira approached the boarding gate and asked
the flight attendant if he could switch his seat assignment to a
more desirable, roomier exit row seat.9 The flight attendant
would not help Cerqueira and instead asked him to sit down. 1°
When Cerqueira later boarded the airplane, the flight attendant
became concerned because Cerqueira immediately went to the
lavatory.'1 Additionally, a man with a ponytail approached the
flight's captain prior to departure and asked whether he would
be piloting the Ft. Lauderdale flight. 12 The captain believed the
exchange with the ponytailed man was unusual. 13 Importantly,
the ponytailed man was not Mr. Cerqueira, but was an Israeli
citizen who, along with his Israeli traveling companion was, by
coincidence, ultimately assigned to the same row aboard the air-
craft as Cerqueira. 4 Through a series of events principally in-
volving the two Israeli men seated next to Mr. Cerqueira
(including the ponytailed man), the flight crew became suspi-
cious of all three men and ultimately notified the Massachusetts
6 See Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2008) (Torruella,
J., dissenting).
7 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 5 n.2; see also Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 484 F.
Supp. 2d 232, 233 (D. Mass. 2007). For an interesting discussion about Mr. Cer-
queira's district court level case, see Jonathan E. DeMay, Recent Developments in
Aviation Law, 73J. AIR L. & COM. 131, 306-09 (2008).
8 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 4-5.
9 Id. at 5. Presumably, such requests are not uncommon given the desirability
of exit row seating. It is therefore curious that the request would be cause for
alarm.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 6.
12 Id. at 4-5.
13 Id.
14 See id. at 5.
132
2009] CERQUEIRA V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
State Police. 5 American then removed Cerqueira and the two
Israelis from the aircraft.' 6 The captain never interviewed any of
the three men himself and testified that the first time he ever
saw the plaintiff was at trial. 7
Once the police removed the three men, the captain phoned
American's control center in Texas and advised supervisory per-
sonnel of the "security issues" surrounding the flight.1 8 Ameri-
can delayed the flight for more than three hours while security
personnel re-screened all of the remaining passengers and
cargo and searched the aircraft with dogs.19 Importantly, after
questioning the three men separately, the police determined
they were not a threat and were "free to go. ' 20 Even though
police cleared all three men before Flight 2237's eventual de-
parture, airline personnel would not allow the men back aboard
the flight.21 Even more troubling, American informed Cer-
queira that it would not allow him to fly aboard any American
flight and refunded the cost of his ticket.22 Cerqueira was
forced to find travel on another carrier.2 3 Several days later, and
in response to an e-mail from Cerqueira to American asking
about the reasons for his removal from the aircraft and the de-
nial of travel on any American flight, American answered that its
"personnel perceived certain aspects of [Cerqueira's] behavior
which could have made other customers uncomfortable. 24
American did not mention any safety concerns when it ex-
15 Id. at 7.
16 Id. The removal decision was based in part on the flight attendants' con-
cerns. Id. The flight attendants were concerned because, among other things,
the two Israelis seated in Cerqueira's row were behaving "boisterous ly]" and
wishing the other passengers "Happy New Year." Id. Although the facts showed
that Cerqueira was not participating in this behavior, the flight attendants were
nonetheless worried because at least one of them believed Cerqueira was feign-
ing sleep. Id.
17 Id. at 7, 9. One interesting question that arises involves how the captain
could have missed seeing three men being removed from his aircraft by the state
police, particularly in light of the fact that it was he who made the initial removal
decision.
18 Id. at 9.
19 Id. at 8-9.
20 Id. at 10.
21 Id. at 9-10. The men were cleared by the police at approximately 9:00 a.m.
Id. at 10. The original flight departed for Ft. Lauderdale at 9:33 a.m. Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 9-10.
23 Id. at 10.
24 Id.
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plained to Cerqueira the reasons for its decision to remove him
and to deny him future service.25
Cerqueira sued American, urging that the carrier wrongfully
discriminated against him in violation of § 1981 based upon his
perceived race.2 6 After trial in federal court, the jury found that
the airline had indeed acted improperly and awarded Cerqueira
$130,000 compensatory damages plus $270,000 punitive dam-
ages.27 American sought both a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and a new trial based on its assertion that there was insuf-
ficient evidence of intentional discrimination. 2  The district
court denied both of American's motions, concluding that the
case "was a quintessential jury trial" in which both parties were
"ably represented by vigorous advocates. '29 The district court
noted that, after hearing all of the testimony and after weighing
the credibility of the witnesses, the jury found that American's
actions were motivated by racial discrimination.3 0 Despite this,
the First Circuit overturned the jury verdict and ordered the dis-
trict court to vacate the judgment for Cerqueira.3
At the center of the First Circuit's holding was the intersec-
tion between § 44902 (b), which permits a carrier to refuse trans-
port to a passenger it decides poses a safety risk, and § 1981,
which prohibits racial discrimination in contracting.32 In the
circuit court's view, unless the carrier's decision to refuse trans-
port is arbitrary or capricious, then its removal authority under
§ 44902(b) will trump its § 1981 liability.33 The First Circuit
held that because the district court's jury instructions did not
delineate the arbitrary and capricious standard specifically
enough, the instructions were perforce faulty.3 4 The court
found that the district court's jury instructions wrongfully subor-
dinated Congress's assignment of safety as the "highest priority
25 See id. American's only response was that it had "fully reviewed the decision"
to prohibit Cerqueira back onboard and found that he was removed and denied
further boarding because "other customers" were 'uncomfortable" with him. Id.
There was no mention of safety concerns or that American had determined Cer-
queira to be inimical to safety. This is unsurprising given that the state police
determined Mr. Cerqueira was not a security threat.
26 Id. at 4.
27 Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 232, 233 (D. Mass. 2007).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 240.
30 Id.
31 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 20.
32 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
3 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 14.
34 Id. at 16-17.
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in air commerce '35 to antidiscrimination law.36 The court based
its decision on a finding of "no evidence" that the captain or
supervisory personnel acted with any "discriminatory animus '
and therefore held that "no properly instructed jury could re-
turn a verdict against the air carrier." '38 Cerqueira filed a motion
for rehearing en banc but was denied. 9
The First Circuit relied on Williams v. Trans World Airlines4' as
authority for the arbitrary and capricious standard of liability im-
posed on a carrier exercising its discretion to refuse to transport
under § 44902(b). 4 In Williams, Trans World Airlines (TWA)
denied passage to an FBI fugitive on a flight from London to
Detroit.42 TWA's president made the decision to deny passage
to Williams after the FBI contacted the airline and warned it
that Williams allegedly possessed a large number of firearms,
was a diagnosed schizophrenic, and was to be considered
"armed and extremely dangerous. ' 4 3 TWA's president invoked
the discretionary powers afforded an airline under the predeces-
sor statute to § 44902(b), 44 but even so, the airline offered Wil-
35 Id. at 11 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1) (2000)).
36 Id. at 16.
37 Id. at 17.
38 Id. at 4. This is true even though a First Circuit dissenting judge noted that
"[t]rial testimony and record evidence indicated that at least one flight attend-
ant's information may have been race-based." Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
520 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (Torruella, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 20-21.
40 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1975).
41 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 14. The court was right to employ the Williams test. It
has become the seminal test in airline removal cases generally. See, e.g., Cordero
v. CIA Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 681 F.2d 669, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1982) (apply-
ing the Williams test to a situation in which a passenger was removed from a flight
after the crew misidentified him as the individual who caused a disturbance
onboard the aircraft); Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 984,
1004 (D. Minn. 2007) (noting that courts routinely use the Williams test to inter-
pret § 44902(b)); Dasrath v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 431,443 (D.NJ.
2006) (defining the Williams case as "one of the leading cases" on passenger re-
moval decisions); Ruta v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 391, 397-98
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (employing the Williams test in a passenger removal case); AI-
Qudhai'een v. Am. West Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 841, 846-47 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (same).
42 Williams, 509 F.2d at 945.
43 Id. at 945 n.5 (quoting an FBI Bulletin sent by the FBI to TWA in advance of
Williams's flight from London to Detroit).
44 Id. at 945. The statute, 49 U.S.C. § 1511(a), which was substantively similar
to its successor § 44902(b), allowed a carrier "to refuse transportation to a pas-
senger when, in the opinion of the air carrier, such transportation would or
might be inimical to safety of the flight." Id. at 946 (internal quotations omitted).
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liams transport on other TWA flights conditioned on Williams's
agreement to certain safety precautions.45 Ultimately, TWA did
transport Williams between London and Detroit.46 In the suit
against TWA, Williams argued that TWA should not have been
allowed to take the FBI's comments about Williams's dangerous-
ness at face value and should have instead conducted a com-
plete investigation itself into Williams's "background and
personal history."47 The Williams court, in affirming the district
court's holding, found that TWA did not act arbitrarily or capri-
ciously in relying on the FBI's warnings and conclusions.4"
Moreover, the court further found that "TWA more than amply
fulfilled its [contractual] obligation to transport Williams" be-
tween London and Detroit by offering him later transport on a
different flight.4 9
Other cases since Williams support the proposition that while
an airline's initial decision to remove a passenger based on
safety concerns is given great deference under § 44902(b), con-
tinued refusal to provide transport even after the safety concerns
have been dispelled may not be entitled to the same deference.
For example, in Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the court
noted that airline personnel have "broad, but not absolute, discre-
tion to remove passengers for safety reasons."50 In that case,
three brown-skinned men behaved suspiciously during the
boarding of a Tampa-bound flight.5' Based upon that behavior,
the captain made a decision to remove the three men from the
45 Id. at 945. For example, TWA offered to transport Williams if he would
agree to be accompanied in flight by a legal attach6 of the U.S. Embassy. Id.
46 Id. at 945-46.
47 Id. at 947.
48 Id. at 948. Specifically, the Williams test for determining whether a
§ 44902(b) removal decision was a proper exercise of airline authority
rests upon the facts and circumstances of the case as known to the
airline at the time it formed its opinion and made its decision and
whether or not the opinion and decision were rational and reason-
able and not capricious or arbitrary in the light of those facts and
circumstances. They are not to be tested by other facts later dis-
closed by hindsight.
Id. If an airline's decision to deny boarding to a passenger is indeed found to be
motivated by race, such decision will fail the Williams test because the decision "is
inherently arbitrary and capricious." Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 515 F.
Supp. 2d 984, 1004 (D. Minn. 2007) (citing Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., 249 F.
Supp. 2d 1198, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
49 Williams, 509 F.2d at 949.
50 467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 445 (D.N.J. 2006) (emphasis added).
-5 See id. at 435-36.
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aircraft.52 Applying the Williams standard to Continental's re-
moval decision, the court granted Continental's summary judg-
ment motion, holding that the removal decision was not
arbitrary or capricious. 53 Importantly, however, after the men
were removed from the Tampa-bound aircraft-and with no fur-
ther security or screening-Continental promptly rebooked the
men on a later Orlando flight (the last Tampa flight of the eve-
ning had already departed) and provided a limousine to drive
the men from Orlando to Tampa.54 Similarly, in Cordero v. CIA
Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., a passenger was removed from a Mex-
icana flight after the flight crew mistakenly identified the pas-
senger as one who was causing a disturbance onboard the
aircraft.5 5 Importantly, similar to the Dasrath case, the airline in
Cordero rebooked the passenger for a flight departing soon after
the original flight.56 The Ninth Circuit, in applying the prede-
cessor statute of §44902(b), adopted the Williams test and up-
held a jury verdict for the plaintiff.57 The court noted that
although "air safety is a paramount concern of air carriers and
of the public generally, we do not believe that requiring carriers
to act reasonably in formulating opinions to deny passage un-
dercuts this concern. ' 58 The Cordero court noted that
the Williams test takes into account the fact that air carriers often
must make decisions within moments of take-off and with less
than perfect knowledge. [Thus, t]he reasonableness of the car-
rier's opinion ... is to be tested on the information available to
the airline at the moment a decision is required.59
In another case similar to Cerqueira, the court refused to grant
summary judgment to the airline for its decision to remove six
Islamic Imams from one of its flights.60 In Shqeirat, the airline
52 Id. at 437.
53 Id. at 433-34, 449.
54 Id. at 437.
55 681 F.2d 669, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1982). Although neither racial discrimina-
tion nor § 1981 claims were at issue in this case, Cordero is nonetheless instructive
because it employs the Williams test to a set of facts involving an airline's decision
to promptly rebook a removed passenger. See id. at 671-72.
56 Id. at 670.
57 Id. at 671-72. The court, however, reversed the jury's award of punitive
damages to the plaintiff, finding that the defendant airline's conduct did not rise
to the level required for such an award. Id. at 672-73.
58 Id. at 671.
59 Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
60 See Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 984, 1004-06 (D.
Minn. 2007).
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based its removal decision on the fact that, among other rea-
sons, some of the Imam passengers switched seats onboard, re-
quested seatbelt extensions, prayed in the boarding lounge, and
possessed one-way tickets.6" Although the six Imams were inter-
viewed and released by the FBI and the Secret Service, the air-
line's ticketing agents nonetheless refused to rebook them.62
On these facts, the district court denied the airline's summary
judgment motion and allowed the Imams to proceed with dis-
covery.63 In Ruta v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the airline removed a
Florida-bound passenger when she arguably yelled at the air-
line's employees, used foul language, kicked a gate agent, and
generally appeared to be intoxicated.64 Despite being removed
from the flight, the passenger was accommodated on another
flight the next day at no additional CoSt. 65 Although this case
centered principally on preemption matters,66 it nonetheless is
instructive for the proposition that a court, in considering the
span of immunity for air carriers under § 44902(b) and in evalu-
ating the arbitrary and capricious standard set out in Williams,
should take into account whether or not the removed passenger
is quickly accommodated on another flight once the situation
prompting the removal de-escalates. Finally, in Al-Qudhai'een v.
America West Airlines, Inc., the airline removed Saudi Arabian pas-
sengers when the airline perceived the passengers' behavior
onboard the first segment of their flight to be suspicious." Af-
ter the FBI questioned the Saudi passengers, the FBI deter-
mined they were not a threat and released them.68 The airline
then promptly rebooked the Saudis on the next flight, apolo-
gized, and upgraded them to first class.6 9 Applying the Williams
61 Id. at 1004.
62 Id. at 990. This is true despite the fact that an agent for the FBI spoke di-
rectly to the airline's ticketing agent and gave the ticketing agent assurances that
the Imams did not pose a security threat. Id.
6" Id. at 1005-06. As of March 20, 2009, the case is still pending in the District
Court of Minnesota. See Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc., No. 0:07-CV-01513
(D. Minn. filed Mar. 12, 2007).
64 322 F. Supp. 2d 391, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Ruta, the plaintiffs race
was not at issue. Instead, the plaintiff argued various state law causes of action
and also contended that she was wrongfully removed from the aircraft in viola-
tion of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 394.
65 Id.
66 The court found that Ruta's state law claims were preempted by the Federal
Aviation Act including § 44902(b). Id. at 397-401.
67 267 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843-44 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
- Id. at 844.
69 Id.
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test, the court noted that the airline's initial decision to remove
the Saudi passengers was not arbitrary and capricious and that
the airline was therefore entitled to § 44902(b) immunity.70
The court thus granted the airline's summary judgment
71motion.
Based upon the evolution of passenger-removal case law, the
First Circuit seems to ignore the teaching of Williams. Looking
through the Williams lens, the Cerqueira court found that a faulty
jury instruction wrongfully subordinated § 44902(b) to the dis-
crimination protections of § 1981.72 The court, though, misap-
plied the Williams test in two important ways. First, the record
shows that state authorities cleared Cerqueira even before his
original flight's actual departure; 7 however, American neverthe-
less prohibited Cerqueira from reboarding that flight. Second,
and as noted in a well-reasoned dissent by one judge in a denial
of Cerqueira's request for rehearing en banc, no court has ever
stretched § 44902(b) so far as to encompass a carrier's refusal to
rebook a passenger on subsequent flights after being cleared to
travel by the authorities. 4 In effect, American made at least
two-arguably three-removal decisions in Cerqueira's case: (1)
the initial removal decision made by the captain when his suspi-
cions were first aroused; (2) the decision by American's employ-
ees to prohibit Cerqueira from reboarding his original flight
even though the state police cleared him before that flight's de-
parture; and (3) the airline's decision to not rebook Cerqueira
on any future American flight, forcing him to find alternative
transportation on his own. The First Circuit, though, seems to
judge all three of these independent decisions based upon the
circumstances of the captain's initial removal decision. This ap-
proach is in plain contradiction to Williams-as refined by Cor-
70 Id. at 848.
71 Id. at 843.
72 Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2008). The district
court instructed the jury that it was "entitled to consider that American Airlines is
expected to operate its airlines [sic] with the primary goal of the safety and well-
being of the traveling public," but that the airline "cannot, they're forbidden by the
law from acting to discriminate." Id. (quoting the jury instruction).
73 See Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 20, 21 n.1 (TorruellaJ., dissent-
ing). Cerqueira was cleared by state police at approximately 9:00 a.m. and his
original flight departed at 9:33 a.m. Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 9-10.
74 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 21 (Torruella, J., dissenting). Indeed, in Williams,
TWA offered the plaintiff other options for travel to Detroit, and in the end, flew
the plaintiff to Detroit aboard one of its own later flights. Williams v. Trans
World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 945 (2d Cir. 1975).
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dero--which calls for testing the reasonableness of the carrier's
decision by the information available "to the airline at the time
it formed its opinion. '"' Thus, the First Circuit's holding ex-
tends beyond those fast-paced, hurried decisions made in the
few remaining minutes before departure time and reaches even
those removal decisions made with the benefit of time and po-
lice investigation.76 Moreover, in Williams, TWA's removal deci-
sion was found not arbitrary and capricious because it was based
on warnings from governmental policing authorities.77 In Cer-
queira, on the other hand, the First Circuit found American was
not liable even though the carrier acted-not in concert with
the police's information-but in plain contradiction to it. The
court does not explain how the carrier, acting in defiance of
Cerqueira's clearance by the state police, was not arbitrary and
capricious in its removal decision, and instead the court dis-
misses away the jury's finding of discrimination by holding that
"no properly instructed jury could return a verdict against the
air carrier."78 By unconditionally allowing § 44902(b) to trump
§ 1981 under the facts of the Cerqueira case, the court does vio-
lence to the arbitrary and capricious standard and permits a car-
rier to now make passenger removal decisions (not limited to
immediate removal decisions, but extending as well to future
rebooking decisions) even though governmental agencies have
decided the passenger is not a security risk. 79
Allowing an airline to override a properly authorized govern-
ment security agent's determination that a passenger poses no
threat could not have been the intention of Congress in enact-
ing § 44902(b), even if airline safety is of paramount priority.
Cases applying the Williams test demonstrate this principle. In
Ruta, Cordero, Dasrath, and Al-Qudhai'een, all of the removed pas-
sengers were rebooked by the respective airlines and allowed to
continue their travels either on the same day or the following
75 Cordero v. CIA Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A., 681 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir.
1982).
76 See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 22 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
77 Williams, 509 F.2d at 948. In Williams, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
carrier-acting on information from a reliable government agency-was not ar-
bitrary or capricious where the FBI's information was not facially "absurd, bi-
zarre, [or] inaccurate." Id.
78 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 4.
79 See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 21-22 (TorruellaJ., dissenting). Indeed, the state
troopers that interviewed and cleared Mr. Cerqueira assumed that he would be
rebooked by American and noted such in the police's administrative log. Cer-
queira, 520 F.3d at 10.
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one. 0 In light of this precedent, then, once the police deter-
mined that Cerqueira was not a security threat, American's con-
tinued refusal to provide him transport on either his original,
yet-to-depart flight or on any remaining American flight seems
per se arbitrary and capricious, since any rational safety con-
cerns related to Cerqueira's presence aboard the aircraft had
been, or should have been, extinguished. Thus, the district
court's jury instruction, which properly balanced the deference
due an airline in its removal decisions with the prohibition on
racial discrimination in contracting, should have been allowed
to stand. Indeed, given these facts and their instruction, the
jury found, not that American had acted merely arbitrarily or
capriciously, but that it had acted with intentional discrimination
against Cerqueira, thereby de facto satisfying the Williams stan-
dard.8' By extending the immunity afforded air carriers under
§ 44902(b) to cover post-clearance rebooking situations, how-
ever, the First Circuit has transformed what was otherwise in-
tended as an "exceptional immunity [for airline security-related
removal decisions] into a legal framework that may apply in all
airline [refusal-to-transport] decisions."82 Instead of working to
80 In Cordero specifically, the airline's prompt rebooking was not enough to
save it from ajury verdict for the plaintiff. See Cordero, 681 F.2d at 672 (reinstating
the jury's verdict for a damage award for plaintiff). Notably, however, there are
at least two cases in which removed passengers were denied rebooking by the
airlines even after the passengers were cleared by authorities. In Shqeirat v. U.S.
Airways Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 984 (D. Minn. 2007), U.S. Airways continued
to prohibit the six Imams from boarding despite assurances from the FBI that the
Imams were not a security threat. Id. at 990. The district court denied defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment and allowed the parties to commence dis-
covery. Id. at 1005-06. A final decision, however, has not been reached (as of
March 20, 2009) in that case. See supra note 63. Similarly, in Chowdhury v. North-
west Airlines Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2002), a U.S. citizen of Ban-
gladeshi ancestry was denied boarding on a Northwest flight even after the FBI,
Northwest itself, and airport security had determined the passenger did not pose
a threat to security. Id. at 1154. In considering the airline's motion to dismiss
the passenger's § 1981 claims, the court noted that the airline could not show
that § 1981 conflicted with § 44902(b), and thus the court refused to dismiss the
plaintiffs civil rights claims. Id. Notably, however, because Northwest Airlines
filed for bankruptcy protection on September 14, 2005, the court closed the
Chowdhury case but left open the possibility that the parties could reopen it later,
if desired. See Chowdhury v. Nw. Airlines Corp., No. 3:02-cv-02665-CRB (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 7, 2005) (order closing the case upon notice of Northwest's bankruptcy
filing).
s See Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234 (D. Mass. 2007).
82 Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 22 (Torruella,J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also
Shqeirat, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (noting that a removal decision based on race is
arbitrary and capricious).
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fit a carrier's removal power into the longstanding civil rights
framework espoused by § 1981 the court regrettably eroded that
framework by diluting its potency.
While the safety of the traveling public is an unquestionably
noble goal, s" it should not, as a matter of policy, come part and
parcel with court-sanctioned racial discrimination, especially in
a scenario in which government security authorities determine
that an individual is safe to fly. In a world in which terrorism-
particularly aimed at the U.S. transportation industry-is a re-
grettable reality, airlines must no doubt be afforded the leeway
to operate safely. The safe operation of an airline should not-
if we are to preserve the underpinnings of our nation's deeply
rooted antidiscrimination principles-come at the expense of
civil rights infringements, however. In Cerqueira, the jury found
that, despite American's wide discretion to operate its airline
safely, its decision to remove Cerqueira was motivated, at its
core, by the racial animus of one or more of American's employ-
ees.84 While split-second removal decisions are an inevitability
in the fast-paced airport environment, it is difficult to under-
stand how a decision in conflict with trained law enforcement
personnel who have investigated the matter is not arbitrary, and
therefore violative of § 1981. If, under these facts, a court will
permit a carrier to seek § 44902(b) immunity from § 1981 racial
discrimination liability, then it is difficult to imagine any scena-
rio where liability would attach-other than perhaps an em-
ployee's outright confession that her removal decision was
motivated by racial animus. Since the outcome of this case al-
most certainly does not reflect true congressional intent with re-
spect to an airline's passenger-removal powers, the First Circuit
has stretched § 44902(b) untenably-and unfairly-far.
83 See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 11 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (a) (1) (2000) and not-
ing that Congress has declared that safety is "the highest priority in air
commerce").
84 See Cerqueira, 484 F. Supp. 2d. at 234, 240.
